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leaving agencies seemingly powerless to 
respond effectively to their sheer scale and 
complexity. But how bad is the global situation?
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to predict, identify and categorise tomorrow’s 
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catastrophes, conflict: This edition addresses 
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for 2016. But, despite the widely-held perception 
that terrorist attacks are increasing, the US State 
Department’s annual terrorism report notes a 
13 per cent decrease in attacks in 2015, with 14 
per cent fewer deaths. This year’s figures might 
be higher (page 52), and modus operandi may 
be shifting, but the line between criminality and 
terrorism has become blurred, and we must be 
wary of classifying all violent criminal acts as 
terrorism, as Christine Jessup warns (page 54).
Again, we know that natural disasters are on 
the rise. But Munich Re says last year saw a 
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CRJ has touched upon in past editions (Prof 
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afford to ignore. Deaths in a world without 
antibiotics could dwarf all other catastrophes, 
killing up to ten million people a year (page 26).
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all our technological advances, prevention, 
co-operation and hard work in crises and 
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only claim more lives than climate, conflict 
and terrorism combined, but augment their 
effects immeasurably. Let’s hope that the high 
level UN meeting on this subject in September 
produces the unequivocal commitment that this 
smouldering global health emergency demands.
Emily Hough
Nanotoxicity risk p22 Flooding in France p16
Pierre Joubert US Navy | Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Jim Watson Jessica Fitzpatrick 2 Scots | Andrew Brown
Safety co-operation in Antarctica p42 De-escalation & negotiation p64
comment
33 join the CRJ LinkedIn group  follow us on twitter @editorialcrj  Crisis Response Journal 12:1 | September 2016
E
nvironmental and agricultural systems are the foundation of 
human existence on earth, as without the right environmental 
conditions the effectiveness of agricultural endeavours would 
be minimal, thus putting global health and political stability into 
jeopardy. The majority of literature addresses the terrorist threat, its 
mitigation, preparedness and response, but does not specifically 
address a significant sector of the US and global populations’ 
foundation, that of agriculture. This article will examine the level of 
preparedness and most likely target of such an attack, as well as 
make recommendations to enhance preparedness and mitigation.
The agricultural sector is made up of many direct and indirect 
components, such as plants, livestock, personnel, manufacturing and 
processing plants and is a large part of the national infrastructure. 
The US has approximately 2.1 million farms and 200,000 registered 
food manufacturing, processing and storage facilities, while 
the UK has approximately 214,000 farms. National budgets on 
terrorism mitigation, preparedness and response have grown 
rapidly over the last decade and have created a: “Well protected 
public infrastructure” but “agriculture is one that has received 
very little attention in this regard,” according to Chalk (2001). 
Not all aspects of agriculture are as vulnerable as others but, 
says Chalk, livestock is an ideal target for a variety of reasons. 
Increased use of steroids to maximise meat production has led 
to increased stress levels and decreased resistance to infections, 
making livestock more susceptible. Vaccinations are not compulsory 
for many conditions, despite the growing concerns over the 
vulnerability of the agricultural sector. Chalk lists 22 conditions that 
this applies to and this list does not include potential agents that 
could be used by a potential attacker. Vaccinations can never address 
all potential threats, but as is the case in the human population, 
currently non-prevalent conditions should not be considered to 
be ‘extinct’ because there is a lack of recorded outbreaks. 
Owing to the large nature of processing and food production 
facilities (eg dairy farms and their milking facilities), an outbreak 
at one facility could spread extremely quickly and would 
justify the mass slaughter of all animals within it, in order to 
minimise further spread of the disease/infection. According 
to one model by the US Department of Agriculture, Foot and 
Mouth disease: “Could spread to as many as 25 states in as 
little as five days through regulated movement,” alone.
The production and processing industries, according to Chalk 
would also not be particularly helpful in limiting the spread 
of contaminated products, as their security, product recall 
procedures and staff screening criteria are also inadequate.
Biological warfare is no modern invention, but owing 
to national and international trade and travel, the potential 
for global consequences are greater than ever before. As 
early as the 14th century BC, rams were used as a carrier of 
tularaemia to target enemies during a conflict, but documented 
cases are more commonly found from 1155 onwards when 
Barbarossa poisoned wells with human bodies in Italy. 
Evidence of attacks against any agricultural system is particularly 
hard to find, as any outbreak of diseases or infestation in animals 
or plants is particularly difficult to link to specific events or 
malicious acts. In the United Kingdom, Public Health England 
(PHE) is currently investigating an outbreak of Escherichia coli 
O157 (E. coli, also known as VTEC), with 109 cases reported 
until July 4, 2016 and no confirmation of the source of the 
outbreak. Several individuals are believed to have eaten mixed 
salad containing rocket leaves, but this does not account for all 
cases. E. coli O157 can lead to kidney failure, stomach pain and 
bloody diarrhoea and is transmitted via contaminated food, such 
as vegetables or undercooked meat, touching an infected animal 
or their faeces and contact with infected individuals. All of these 
transmission routes are likely to be part of daily activities on 
farms, making identification of the origin of the organism very 
complicated to trace, if not impossible. No particular producer, 
farm or facility has been identified and, from publicly available 
information, this does not appear to be a malicious act or attack. 
However, this case is a reminder of how even accidental 
exposure to a pathogen, where most steps of the process the 
product undergoes are known, can be challenging to trace. 
An intentional release or introduction of an organism into 
the product – with avoidance of detection being part of the 
attackers’ strategy – would be even more difficult to identify.
The basis of any successful attack is the means and availability 
of the required knowledge, personnel, equipment and motivation 
to execute the planned attack. As discussed above, the agricultural 
sector has not been well prepared for a terrorist threat, reducing 
the amount of knowledge and resources required to initiate 
an attack, as there are less prevention measures in place. 
Means to execute an attack can occur at multiple levels, 
depending on the would-be perpetrators’ abilities. The simplest 
approach would start at the level of the farmer, who either 
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personally or unknowingly through staff, introduces a disease 
into the livestock or fresh produce before it is sent to the processing 
facilities, either on or off site. This is what could have occurred 
in this year’s case of E. coli O157 in the UK and might not even 
have been caused by a person, but by a faulty piece of equipment. 
The lack of monitoring and screening procedures at these 
facilities could lead to a rapid spread and possibly undetected 
distribution, not just nationally but internationally. Olson (2012) 
supports this theory, arguing that fruit and vegetable packaging 
facilities are: “Among the most vulnerable venues for food-
borne attacks.” Either way, both livestock and fresh produce face 
similar challenges as diseases, pathogens and chemicals could 
be introduced and unknowingly distributed to various locations 
without any knowledge or intent of the facility or its staff.
Mitigation has to start with an appropriate risk assessment of the 
entire industry to identify all potential origins of significant threats. 
These threats might only be the ones identified by Chalk, but could 
already have been modified or changed to meet the goals of the 
terrorist groups that are planning on using them since his paper 
was published in 2001. In the meantime, basic measures, such as 
increased regulations for employee screening, quality control and 
surveillance of facilities could help to eliminate the risk from ‘entry 
level’ criminals who are attempting to trial attacks in a small scale 
experiment before targeting a larger facility/target demographic. 
Screening of all individual items that depart or enter 
farms, processing and packing facilities is unlikely to be 
a viable option, as tests are time consuming, require a 
budget to accommodate this and these are statistically not 
likely to be a source of a potential attack at this time. 
Updating of emergency response plans is also a key intervention 
and while the National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
can be used for any type of event, without further allocation of 
resources and mitigation plans the incident commander will not 
have any means to effectively execute his/her duties in such 
a scenario. Chalk also recommended the adjustment of the 
veterinary science curriculum to include: “A greater emphasis 
on large-scale animal husbandry and foreign/exotic disease 
recognition,” essentially increasing the chances of abnormal 
conditions to be recognised earlier. Should this threat be ignored, 
the likelihood exists that an attack could be undetected, leading 
to the death of a significant amount of people worldwide. 
Chalk points out that, as a consequence, the US economy could 
become unstable through lost revenue and possible international 
trade restrictions, which would most likely result in loss of political 
support by the general population (ie the voters) and go as far as 
social instability owing to a resulting mass panic from these attacks. 
First line of detection
Preparedness and mitigation planning not only need to include 
actions to take following an outbreak, but also measures to address 
public concerns and responses to actual or suspected attacks.
Incident identification and response are another important 
area. In the event of an attack, response procedures need to be 
initiated and effectively executed, which raises the question of 
levels of preparedness and knowledge in emergency responders, 
physicians, law enforcement personnel and people involved in 
agricultural and related activities regarding acts of bioterrorism. A 
study of 34 undergraduate medical schools in the UK and Ireland 
found that “little teaching” on bioterrorism, chemical weapons 
and biological weapons currently takes place and suggests that 
the situation would only change if the schools were required to 
address this. Before victims of any attacks present to healthcare 
facilities or law enforcement officials are alerted, farm personnel 
are the first line of detection and defence against bioterrorism 
and they should be included in training and response planning 
endeavours. But what knowledge do they need to possess? 
The Criminal Investigation Handbook on Agroterrorism, published 
by the US Department of Agriculture, provides many clues on 
what to watch out for, but there are no definitive signs that point 
towards an attack. Pattern recognition in livestock population, fresh 
produce, staff behaviour and other anomalies is the most likely way 
to identify a potential threat/attack or disease. Law enforcement, 
like many other branches of public safety, is also affected by 
budget cuts, but is responsible for leading the investigation into all 
criminal incidents, including (bio) terrorism, until the appropriate 
lead agency takes over; a task for which it is not necessarily 
prepared or funded to prepare for. In order for local law enforcement 
agencies to be able to notify their superiors of suspected acts of 
bioterrorism, they would need to be able to identify them, which 
is always a challenging task, even with specialist training. 
First responders, law enforcement officers, ambulance personnel 
and other frontline healthcare providers should be made aware of 
potential signs, symptoms and clues that might point towards a 
biological agent or pathogen having been deployed. That said, an 
attack could be or will most likely be: “Virtually indistinguishable 
from natural outbreaks,” at least for a certain amount of time, and: 
“A naturally occurring epidemic could provide the attacker with 
deniability,” according to the USDA. This is because its signs and 
symptoms cannot necessarily be attributed to a particular pathogen.
Environmental targets are another area where attention is required. 
There is no doubt that the attack on an ecosystem, such as a dam, 
wetland or a source of drinking water, would have detrimental 
consequences but in order to harm the highest amount of people, the 
method of targeting livestock and fresh produce appears to be the 
more likely of the two. Contamination of drinking water, for example, 
would probably only affect one or two regions, owing to the way in 
which water is distributed. Vulnerable points in a water distribution 
system are also more easily controlled than farmland, as these 
are dedicated facilities within a reasonably small area. Targeting a 
farming community would spread the disease through the entire 
county and country within days, possibly even globally, before a 
potential attack would be detected. By comparison, a contaminated 
water source could be tested, isolated and decontaminated, which 
would limit the amount of individuals exposed to the biological 
agent. This is not the case with contaminated animal products 
and fresh produce, as individual components might be spread out 
over various counties, facilities and areas, significantly hindering 
accountability regarding its origin and controllability of the pathogen. 
The lack of risk assessments in the agricultural and environmental 
systems sectors has undoubtedly allowed their vulnerability to 
terrorist attacks and care has to be taken not to focus only on 
prevention and preparedness, but also detection and response. 
First responders, farm staff and all other personnel involved in food 
production and agriculture should be encouraged to raise anything 
they consider suspicious, without risk of repercussion for expressing 
their concerns. Terrorists, like other criminals, will always aim for 
the weak points in a system. A successful attack could result in 
consequences far beyond traditional terrorist acts and could bring 
the threat into every home in the US (or elsewhere in the world). 
Public fears could become so immense that political instability 
is a strong possibility, ultimately playing into the hands of terrorists. 
Fear plays a key role in terrorism and large numbers of casualties 
are not necessarily needed to achieve this. People being afraid to 
undertake everyday activities – such as eating or drinking – could 
have much further reaching consequences than a physical, violent 
attack on particular targets. 
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